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NOTES
STATE ANTI-DILUTION STATUTES UNDER
THE PRE-EMPTION ANALYSES OF GADE V.
NATIONAL SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT
ASS'N
INTRODUCTION
In 1992, the Supreme Court, in Gade v. National Solid Wastes
Management Ass'n, held that Illinois law, which provided for the
training, testing and licensing of hazardous waste site workers, was
pre-empted by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act
(hereinafter OSH Act).1 While the decision to pre-empt command-
ed a majority of the court, the majority did not agree on the
grounds for pre-emption.2 The plurality argued for implied
pre-emption.3 The concurrence argued for express pre-emption.4
The competing pre-emption viewpoints expressed by the members
of the Court create an extremely interesting tension. Four justices
held for implied pre-emption based on an extremely expansive
implied intention inquiry.5 One justice held that the language of
the federal OSH Act expressly pre-empted the state statute. 6 But,
five justices, combining the concurrence and dissenters, held that
there was no direct conflict between the state legislation and the
federal Act.7
1 Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992).
2The plurality consisted of J. O'Connor (writing), C.J. Rehnquist, J. White, and J. Scalia.
J. Kennedy concurred, basing his finding of pre-emption only on express grounds.
3 Gade, 505 U.S. at 108-09 (J. Kennedy, concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
4 Id. at 109.
5Id. at 98-99.
6 Id. at 109.
'Id. at 110, 115.
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Justice Kennedy provided the swing vote. Although he found no
conflict between the state and federal laws, he found express pre-
emption based on an expansive, holistic reading of the statute.' Of
especial interest is Kennedy's observation that in the absence of
express pre-emption, the states should be allowed to supplement
existing federal regulation.9 This observation raises interesting
questions under the Lanham Act, which many commentators
currently understand as providing only a floor of federal regula-
tion.10
The Court stated that the divination of Congressional intent was
of primary importance in implied pre-emption analysis.11 The
plurality looked not only to the language and structure of the OSH
Act to find this intent, but also to its legislative history.12 The
broad reach of the implied pre-emption analysis, looking to
legislative history, exposes state anti-dilution statutes to a new
attack.
The purpose of this Note is to assess state anti-dilution statutes'
ability to withstand pre-emption analysis under the framework
established in Gade. The discussion will first detail the method of
analysis applied by the Supreme Court in Gade. The goal of this
initial investigation is to extract the analytical framework from the
OSH Act context. The discussion will then proceed to an overview
of the development and content of anti-dilution statutes. Finally,
the pre-emption framework derived from Gade will be applied to
the state antidilution statutes.
PLURALITY AND CONCURRENCE IN GADE
The state of Illinois enacted statutes in 1988 governing the
licensing of hazardous waste equipment operators. 3  The laws
a Gade, 505 U.S. at 109-14.
Id. at 110-11.
10 David S. Welkowitz, Preemption, Extraterritoriality, and the Problem of State
Antidilution Laws, 67 TuL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1992).
"Gade, 505 U.S. at 96 (quotingAilis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985)).
"Id. at 100-02.
"Hazardous Waste Equipment Operators and Laborers Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 225,
para. 220(1)-(17) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 7701-17 (1991))
and Hazardous Waste Laborers Licensing Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 225, para. 221(1)-(15)
(Smith-Hurd 1993) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 7801-15 (1991)).
136 [Vol. 3:135
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established stringent standards such as 4,000 hours minimum
experience working with the equipment used for the handling of
hazardous waste. 14  The state justified the measures on the
ground that they protected the health and safety of employees and
the general public.'"
Before the effective date of the licensing requirements, the
National Solid Waste Management Association brought suit in
federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that the state
legislation was pre-empted by the OSH Act.16 The Association is
a national trade group comprised of businesses that handle many
aspects of hazardous waste transport and disposal. 7 The district
court held that pre-emption under the OSH Act would not be a
problem if the laws had a "legitimate and substantial purpose apart
from promoting job safety."" The court then applied that stan-
dard and found that the laws were not pre-empted because their
goals included protection of the public at large."
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
OSH Act pre-empted all state laws that, without explicit approval
by the Secretary of Labor, directly, clearly and substantially
regulated worker health and safety.20 The court of appeals
remanded the case without a finding of pre-emption because the
regulations mandated by the state laws had not reached their final
form.2' The court of appeals made clear, however, that the state
could not protect employee health and safety by passing laws under
the mask of environmental regulation or protection of the general
"Id. para. 220(5Xd) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (formerly 7705(d)).
16 Gade, 505 U.S. at 93.
16 Natl Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Killian, No. 88 C 10732, 1989 WL 96438 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 17, 1989), vacated, 918 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1990), affd, 505 U.S. 88 (1992). The
Association's declaratory judgment suit was also predicated on the ground of interference
with the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court does not address this issue in its
pre-emption discussion, and from a theoretical standpoint it is inapposite to the current
discussion.
I Gade, 505 U.S. at 93.1 8Killian, No. 88 C 10732, 1989 WL 96438 at *3.
19 Id. at *5. One component of the laws was invalidated. The requirement of training
within the state of Illinois was deemed outside of the stated purposes of the statute. Id.20 Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Killian, 918 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1990), affd, 505 U.S.
88 (1992).
21 Id. at 684.
19951
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welfare.22 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address what
it deemed to be a conflict among the circuits regarding the pre-
emptive effect of the OSH Act on certain state regulations.23
The Court began its discussion by defining the fundamental
question in the pre-emption analysis to be one of Congressional
intent.24 The plurality's discussion of the structure of pre-emption
is important because of the wide range it leaves to implied
pre-emption. 2' The plurality bifurcated pre-emption into two basic
types: express and implied. 6 The pre-emption is express if
"Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's lan-
guage."27 The pre-emption is implied if it is "implicitly contained
in [the statute's] structure and purpose." 28
With this description of the two branches of pre-emption, the
plurality proceeded to further subdivide implied pre-emption.
29
Under that general heading, there are "at least two types of implied
pre-emption." ° The first, where the federal regulation provides
such a comprehensive scheme that there can be no reasonable
inference that Congress intended room to be left for the states to
regulate, is field pre-emption.3 The second, where it is either
physically impossible to comply with the federal and state regula-
tions simultaneously or where the state law operates as an
interference to the fulfillment and satisfaction of the federal
"purposes and objectives," is conflict pre-emption. 32
The plurality opinion, in applying its analytical framework to the
2 Id.
Gade, 505 U.S. at 95.
2 Id. at 96.
' Id. at 109 ("[The plurality view] is based on an undue expansion of our implied
pre-emption jurisprudence.... .") (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 98.
Id. (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
28 Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
2 id.
o Id. (emphasis added). While the plurality does not specify any other subdivisions of
implied pre-emption, it seems to imply that field and conflict pre-emption are not the
exhaustive list. This is reinforced by Kennedy's observation of the troublesome broadness
of the plurality's opinion.
"' Id. (quoting Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Dela Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53
(1982)).
S2 Id. at 2383 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963)) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
138 [Vol. 3:135
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facts of the instant case, further refined the scope of field and
conflict pre-emption.33 Although the plurality applied the term
"conflict pre-emption" to the case before it, it said that "field
pre-emption" would have been an equally appropriate term.' 4 The
plurality explained that" '[flield pre-emption may be understood as
a species of conflict pre-emption.' "
As to the specifics of conflict pre-emption, the plurality stated
that state law conflicts with federal law when it "'stands as an
obstacle' to the full implementation of a federal law.""' There are
two points for a court to consider when determining if the state law
is an obstacle. First, the court must look to the stated purpose of
the state law in question.37 Because the state has an incentive to
avoid pre-emption by offering up pretextual reasoning, the court is
required to look further. In the deeper, second examination, it
must look to the state law's actual impact.' The plurality makes
clear that even if the federal and state laws are aimed at the same
end results, pre-emption will occur if the state law interferes with
the means by which the federal statute seeks to achieve those
ends.39
Having established this framework, the Court announced its
holding that "the nonapproved state regulation of occupational
safety and health issues for which a federal standard is in effect is
impliedly pre-empted as in conflict with the full purposes and
objectives of the OSH Act."4 The plurality then launched into the
method of analysis that supports that holding.41
The plurality's pre-emption analysis can be divided into two
parts. The first part is its examination of the statutory language
of the OSH Act.4" Contending that the plurality incorrectly
included this examination under the rubric of implied pre-emption,
Gade, 505 U.S. at 98.
4 Id. at 104 n.2.
Id. at 104 n.2 (quoting English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79-80 n.5 (1990)).
Id. at 103 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
37 Id. at 105 (quoting English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 84 (1990)).
38 Gade, 505 U.S. at 105 (quoting English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 84 (1990)).
39 Id. at 103 (quoting International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987)).
"0 Id. at 98-99.
41Id. at 99. For purposes of the pre-emption discussion, the description of Gade will focus
on the court's methodology versus the implications of the environmental regulation.
42 Id. at 99-100.
1995] 139
5
Boyd: State Anti-Dilution Statutes Under the Pre-emption Analyses of Ga
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1995
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
Justice Kennedy was forced to splinter off into a concurring
position.43 The second part is the plurality's examination of the
legislative history of the OSH Act. 4
The plurality termed as the "ultimate task in any pre-emption
case" the determination of whether the state regulation is "consis-
tent with the structure and purpose of the statute as a whole."' 5
That said, the plurality turned to an examination of the plain
language of the statute.46 The plurality cited as the "principal
indication" of Congress' intent to pre-empt state law a section of the
OSH Act, § 18(b), which outlines the procedure that a state "shall"
follow if it desires to take over regulation of any occupational safety
and health area which is currently under federal regulation.47
The court read the mandatory language of the statute as a plain
negation of the state's power to assume such responsibility without
adherence to the procedure outlined for obtaining the Secretary's
approval.4"
The plurality buttressed this argument by looking to § 18(a),
which protects any state regulation of occupational safety and
health areas for which no federal standard is in effect. 49 In the
eyes of the plurality, this "savings clause" supports the negative
inference that where state laws regulate areas for which there is
federal regulation, there is no pre-emption protection.5 0  This
reading is necessary, according to the plurality, or § 18(b) becomes
superfluous.5
The plurality found similar support for its view by looking to two
other provisions, § 18(c) and § 18(f).52 The former provides the
requirements a state plan must meet in order to be approved by the
Secretary.53 The latter mandates the approval of the Secretary
before a state can begin to regulate in an area where there is
' Gade, 505 U.S. at 104 n.2; id. at 109.
"Id. at 101-02.
45 Id. at 98.
46 Id. at 99-01.
47 Gade, 505 U.S. at 99.
48 id.
49 Id. at 100.
50 Id.
51Id.
52 Gade, 505 U.S. at 100-01.
"29 U.S.C. § 667(c) (1988); 505 U.S. at 100-01.
[Vol. 3:135
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The importance of the plain language of the statute to the
plurality's finding of implied pre-emption is indicative of how very
narrow a scope remains for express pre-emption. The plurality
would presumably find express pre-emption only in cases where the
statute explicitly says, "the state may not legislate" or "all state
legislation/regulation coincident with this federal legislation shall
be pre-empted."55 While such language is not uncommon in
federal statutes that intend to pre-empt state laws, Justice
Kennedy found serious problems with giving such phrases talis-
manic significance.56
Kennedy did not join the plurality solely because he found the
line, as delineated by the plurality, between express and implied
pre-emption to be far too formalistic.57 He would instead allow
non-explicit statutory language to create express pre-emption when
such a reading is a legitimate interpretation of the "clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."" According to Kennedy, the
plurality's expansive implied pre-emption definition violates basic
principles of pre-emption jurisprudence.59 Kennedy argued that
the "historic police powers" of the state should not be overridden
absent explicit Congressional intent and, further, that Congres-
sional purpose should be the ultimate guide in all pre-emption
cases.60 By broadening the scope of implied pre-emption, the
plurality encouraged an analytical path that will allow unbridled
judicial investigation into tensions between state and federal
objectives. 6 According to Kennedy, pre-emption is the sole
prerogative of the legislature.62  The plurality's method, by
encouraging a broad investigation to discern possible grounds for
pre-emption, undermines the exclusive right of the federal legisla-
529 U.S.C. § 667(h) (1988); Gade, 505 U.S. at 101.
"See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (advocating need for explicit pre-emptive language).
Id. at 112.
5 Id. at 109.
Id. at 111 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
59 Id. at 109-11.
' Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (quoting Rice v.
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ture to pre-empt state law.63
Kennedy concurred, however, because he believed that the state
legislation was expressly pre-empted by the federal OSH Act.'
He argued that precedent supported a broad statutory inquiry in
express pre-emption cases." It is then entirely appropriate to
look for Congressional intent not just in specific statutory pre-emp-
tion phrases but in the "language, structure, and purposes of the
statute as a whole."6 In applying such a holistic examination to
the statute, the concurrence falls into total agreement with the
plurality's statutory analysis.67
Significantly, however, the plurality added another component to
its pre-emption analysis. It goes from the statutory language into
the legislative history to further validate its statutory reading.6
This seemingly unnecessary extension raises concerns consistent
with Justice Kennedy's fear of an overly broad definition of implied
pre-emption. If the scope of express pre-emption is limited to
explicit, magic word pre-emption phrases, those statutes whose
structure manifests a Congressional intent to pre-empt state
involvement will be vulnerable to a more far-reaching judicial
inspection under the auspices of implied pre-emption. Accepting
the plurality's analytical framework, a court should not only look
to the structure of the statute, it should also search into external
sources including the legislative history. In those cases, as Justice
Kennedy feared, the traditionally exclusive prerogative of the
federal Congress to pre-empt state legislation may well be under-
cut.
An examination of the scope of the plurality's historical inquiry
in Gade illustrates the liberality of its analysis. The plurality used
the legislative history of another section of the OSH Act to support
63 Id.
6Id. at 109.
6Gade, 505 U.S. at 111-12 (citing English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990); Jones
v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,525, reh'g denied, Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 431 U.S. 925
(1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)).
6Id. at 112 (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990)).
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an inference of pre-emption.69 Section 18(h) contains the transi-
tional provisions for the OSH Act.7" Under the Act's authority,
the Secretary could enter into agreements with the state that
would allow the state to continue to enforce its occupational health
and safety standards for two years or until the Secretary took some
final action.7'
The plurality found it significant that section 18(h) did not limit
its application to those areas in which the state wished to totally
replace coincident federal standards.72  The plurality read the
section as requiring agreements in all areas. 73 The facial implica-
tion of the missing limitation was that the state could not continue
unapproved regulation even in areas where its regulation could be
deemed supplemental to the federal regulation.74
To support this reading, the plurality pointed to the original
Senate version of the provision.75 In that version, the state could
enter into agreements with the Secretary only if the standards it
wished to enforce were not in conflict with the federal standards.76
The early Senate version found a conflict between the state
regulation and the federal regulation even if the state standards
were more stringent than the federal standards.77
The plurality concluded that, even though the Senate version of
the provision was not included in the final act, it demonstrated the
Congressional understanding that stricter state standards did not
relieve the state of the necessity of entering into a transitional
agreement.78 Perhaps cognizant of the analytical problem of
showing Congressional intent via a provision that was eliminated
from the final version of the Act, the plurality further stated that
Gade, 505 U.S. at 101-102; see Jane M. Lyons, Note, Gade v. National Solid Wastes
Management Association: Reality Check on the Preemption Doctrine, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POLY 563,573 (1993) ("[Tlhe plurality switched from trying to give effect to every word
of the statute to placing significant reliance on the legislative history..
70 29 U.S.C. § 667(h) (1988); Gade, 505 U.S. at 101-02.
7' Gade, 505 U.S. at 101.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 101-02.
75 Gade, 505 U.S. at 101-02.
76 S. 2193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 17(h), 116 CONG. REc. 37637 (1970); Gade, 505 U.S. at
101-02.
77 Gade, 505 U.S. at 101-02.
78 Id. at 102.
1995] 143
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the Secretary's contemporaneous reading of the enacted § 18(h)
expressed the same understanding.79
It is essential to note that while the plurality inferred from the
legislative history a Congressional intent to pre-empt even those
state standards which exceeded the federal standards, Kennedy's
concurrence does not reach a similar conclusion. Restricting his
analysis to the text of the statute, Kennedy made clear that lacking
the "express provisions," he "would not say that state supplementa-
ry regulation conflicts with the purposes of the" federal Act.' The
state, in Kennedy's view, has the right to "ratchet" up.81
The plurality proceeded from its finding of implied pre-emption
to dismiss the state's remaining arguments.82 The plurality
expressly refused to provide any exception to pre-emption for state
statutes that address public safety in addition to occupational
health and safety concerns.' They then reasoned that under the
implied pre-emption framework, state law can present an obstacle
deserving conflict pre-emption not merely on the basis of its stated
purpose, but also on the basis of its actual effect." Finally, they
concluded that the Court's own precedent demanded OSH Act
pre-emption of dual-impact regulation.85
DISSENT IN GADE
Justices Souter, Blackmun, Stevens and Thomas dissented. 6
The ground for their dissent was their belief that the majority of
the Court had ignored the requisite presumption against pre-emp-
tion. 7 The dissent argued that because the starting point of any
pre-emption analysis is the "presumption that 'Congress did not
79 Id.; see 29 CFR § 1901.2 (1972) (allowing Secretary to provide temporary alternative
to Federal pre-emption under § 18(h)).
80 Gade, 505 U.S. at 111.
S Id. at 110.
82 Id. at 108-09. The state's other arguments are too ancillary to develop the implied
pre-emption framework. They are, therefore, inapposite to this discussion.
" Gade, 505 U.S. at 106-07.
&4 Id.
' Id. The Court's discussion of dual impact legislation is beyond the scope of this
discussion.
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intend to displace state law,'" the majority erred in reading what
the dissent considered to be ambiguous statutory phrasing to be
indicative of a Congressional intent to pre-empt." The dissent
then proceeded through its own, section-by-section, statutory
analysis to support its opinion against pre-emption.
The dissent gave special treatment to § 18(h), the section the
plurality backed with legislative history.89  In the dissent's
reading, the transitional provision was only a means of allowing
states to shift from pre-Act state plans to post-Act state plans.90
The majority, however, read the provision to force pre-Act state
plans into federal regulation and then, if approved, to post-Act
state plans.91 The dissent argued that its reading of the statute
was superior because it requires only one such conversion as
opposed to two.
THE PRE-EMPTIVE FRAMEWORK
A majority of the Court found pre-emption by looking at the
statute in a holistic fashion. The plurality, under the implied
pre-emption rubric, took its investigation beyond the statute into
the legislative history. Even though Justice Kennedy's concurrence
did not leave the text of the statute, his express pre-emption
reading is also very broad. The most significant aspect of the
plurality and the concurring opinions is the weak restraint afforded
by the traditional presumption against pre-emption. The troubling
conclusion to be drawn from the de-emphasis of this presumption
is that the Court is increasingly willing to apply broad pre-emption
theories to pre-empt state law.92
-Gade, 505 U.S. at 116 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 541 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
89 Id. at 120.
9
0 Id. at 121.
' Id. (according to dissent).
12 Lyons, supra note 69, at 580.
1995] 145
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APPLICATION TO STATE ANTI-DILUTION LAWS
The creation of trademark anti-dilution theory is generally
credited to Frank Schechter.93  Schechter's "radical thesis"
changed the essence of a trademark's character. Under tradi-
tional trademark doctrine, the trademark holder has no ownership
right in the trademark itself.95 Instead, the trademark holder has
the limited right to enjoin third parties from using his trade-
mark.96 The limitations on the trademark holder's right are such
that the third party must be competing with the trademark holder
and the use of the mark must be creating a likelihood of confusion,
mistake or deception.
97
Schecter, however, argued that confusion should not be a
necessary element in the devaluation of a trademark.9 Even if a
third party consumer was not likely to be confused, Schecter
suggested that the force and worth of the mark itself could be
diluted.99 As a logical consequence, Schecter argued for doing
away with the confusion requirement."°
The theoretical impact of discarding the confusion requirement
is substantial.'" The trademark holder's right begins to shift
from a right to exclude others from using the mark toward owning
an actual property interest in the mark. 2 The monopolistic
consequences of such a shift are obvious.
Although trademark dilution theory was arguably born in
" Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813
(1927), reprinted in 22 TRADEMARK BULL. 139 (1927), and 60 TRADEMARK REP. 334 (1970).
" Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal
Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433,438 (1994); Schechter, supra note
95, at 825.
" See Port, supra note 94, at 438 (discussing origins of trademark dilution). See also
Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REv. 519, 553
(1993) (distinguishing between rights of patent and copyright holders from rights of
trademark holders).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1989) (providing requirements for registration of trademarks);
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994) (providing remedies for infringement of trademarks).
17 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994).
"Schechter, supra note 93, at 825.
99Id.
100 Id.
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1927,03 it was not until 1947 that a state actually adopted an
anti-dilution statute. 104 Subsequently, the International Trade-
mark Association (hereinafter ITA) has become a firm supporter of
anti-dilution legislation. 5 To that end, the ITA has developed
a model anti-dilution statute.'06 Since 1947, twenty-eight states
have, either statutorily or through the common law, added
trademark anti-dilution protection to their corpus of law. 10 7
Generally, state anti-dilution legislation provides for some sort
of injunctive relief, regardless of a likelihood of consumer confu-
sion."08 In many states the mark need not even be registered to
get anti-dilution protection. The result of the mixture of state
actions is a "checkerboard of differing rights," above and behind
103 There are earlier references, but Schecter's is generally recognized as the first full
articulation of dilution. Laura M. Slenzak, Dilution Law in the United States and Canada:
A Review of the State of the Law and a Proposal for United States Federal Dilution
Protection, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 205, 208 (1993). See Eastman Photographic Material Co. v.
John Griffith's Cycle Corp., 15 RPC 105 (1898); Judgment of September 11, 1924,
Landesgericht ElberfeldU, 25 Juristiche Wochemschrift 502, XXV Markenschutz und
Wettbewerb (MUR) 264.
104 Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307, § 7(a), 1947 Mass. Acts 300, repealed by 1973 Acts, ch.
897, § 2, replaced by Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 110B, § 12 (West 1993).
1 Port, The 'Unnatural" Expansion of Tudemark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute
Necessary?, supra note 94, at 439.
106 Id.
107 See Ala. Code § 8-12-17 (1993); Ark. Code Ann. § 4-71-113 (Michie 1991); Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code § 14330 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-1li(c) (1987 & Supp.
1995); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 3313 (1993); Fla. Stat. ch. 495.151 (1991); Ga. Code Ann. §
10-1-451 (1991); Idaho Code § 48-512 (1977); Ill. Ann. Stat, ch. 765, para. 104013
(Smith-Hurd 1992); Iowa Code § 548.114 (Supp. 1995); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:223.1 (West
1987); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1980); Mass. Gen. L. ch. 110B, § 12 (1990);
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 417.061 (1994); Mont. Code Ann. § 30-13-334 (1995); Neb. Rev. Stat. §
87-122 (1994); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 350-A:12 (1995); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-3-10 (Michie
1978 & Supp. 1994); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d (McKinney 1984); Or. Rev. Stat. § 647.107
(1988); 54 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1124 (1992); R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-2-12 (1992); Tenn. Code Ann. §
47-25-512 (1995); Tex. Bus & Com. Code Ann. § 16.29 (West Supp. 1995); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 19.77.160 (Supp. 1995).
1"8 See Kimbley L. Muller, Dilution Law: At a Crossroad? A Position of Advocacy in
Support of Adoption of a Preemptive Federal Antidilution Statute, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 175,
178-79 (1993) (discussing both state statutes and USTA's model anti-dilution statute). See
generally Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of Preemption,
76 IOWA L. REV. 959, 1006 (1991) (discussing contents of'typical' state anti-dilution statute).
While this point will be drawn out in greater detail below, it is important to note here that
the removal of the confusion requirement makes it very clear that the statute is not
protecting the public from being misled. Instead, it is protecting some sort of a property
right the holder has in the mark.
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which lies the backdrop of the Lanham Act."°
The Lanham Act, adopted in 1946, provides for the federal
registration and protection of trademarks. The Act is silent as to
trademark dilution. Under a superficial reading of Gade, it is
tempting to conclude that because there is no federal regulation of
trademark dilution there is no pre-emption problem. Such a
conclusion, however, ignores both the peculiar relation of federal
and state trademark regulation and the nuances and flexibility of
the implied pre-emption doctrine.
The pre-emption doctrine, as outlined by the plurality and
concurrence in Gade, bases pre-emption on Congressional intent.
This intent is derived from specific passages of the federal act, its
structure as a whole, and, in the case of the plurality, its legislative
history. To evaluate the federal pre-emption of state anti-dilution
laws under the Lanham Act, then, it is necessary to undergo an
examination of these aspects of the Act.
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE LANHAM ACT
The Lanham Act does not, by virtue of any single provision
explicitly pre-empt state dilution statutes. 10 There is no magic
word pre-emption provision. Therefore, barring the opinion of
Justice Kennedy, no argument for express pre-emption under the
Act exists. As the plurality in Gade extolled, however, the implied
pre-emption analysis cannot "be guided by a single sentence or
member of a sentence, [instead it is necessary to] look to the
provisions of the whole law.""'
109 United States Jaycees v. Commodities Magazine, Inc., 661F. Supp. 1360, 136S, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1119, 1125 (N.D. Iowa 1987) (citing M. Handler, Are the State Antidilution
Laws Compatible with the National Protection of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269
(1985)).
"1 James M. Wetzel, Federal Preemption Under the Lanham Act, 76 TRADEMARK REP.
243, 245 (1986); Welkowitz, supra note 10, at S.
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THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE LANHAM ACT
There is very little disagreement that the Lanham Act is not
structured in such a way as to preclude all state regulation of
trademarks.1 12  To the contrary, the Act, by its own terms,
expects that certain state trademark protections will remain in
place." 3 The structure of the Act, then, does not prohibit all
state regulation. One district court has described the Lanham Act
as "a nationwide floor, assuring the public and trademark owners
at least a minimum level of protection. " ""
This is an important difference with the situation presented to
the Court in Gade. In that case, the plurality was persuaded that
the statutory scheme of the OSH Act reflected a Congressional
intent to place only one layer of regulation on employers and
employees." 5 The Lanham Act presents a situation of comple-
mentary regulation. 1 6 But the statutory scheme of the Lanham
Act, while accepting some complementary regulation, does not
clearly accept it in a plenary fashion. In other words, the statutory
scheme does not preclude exclusive federal regulation in some
areas, or conversely no state regulation in other areas. 7
A finding that state regulation is permissible under the Lanham
Act does not provide a carte blanche to state legislatures. As the
plurality warned, there are "at least two types of implied pre-
emption.""' A statutory scheme that allows for limited or expan-
sive coincident regulation can only shut down the subcategory of
112 Plasticolor Molded Products v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F. Supp. 1329, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1023 (C.D. Cal. 1989) vacated, 767 F. Supp. 1036, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1975 (C.D.
1991); Richard A. De Sevo, Antidilution Laws: The Unresolved Dilemma of Preemption
Under the Lanham Act, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 300 (1994); Welkowitz, supra note 10, at 12-13.
113 See 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1994) (given certain conditions, the right to use a mark is not
contestable "except to the extent, if any, to which the use of a mark registered on the
principal register infringes a valid right acquired under the law of any State") (emphasis
added); Plasticolor Molded Products, 713 F. Supp. at 1346; Handler, supra note 111, at 283.1 14 Plasticolor Molded Products, 713 F. Supp. at 1345. Contra United States Jaycees, 661
F. Supp. at 1368 (holding that state law was invalid because it frustrated uniformity, major
goal of Lanham Act) (vigorously criticized by court in Plasticolor Molded Products).
115 Gade, 505 U.S. at 99.
115 See supra notes 105-107.
117 Congress could intend no state regulation in an area, despite federal inactivity in that
area solely for the sake of national uniformity.
118 Gade, 505 U.S. at 98.
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field pre-emption." 9 Conflict pre-emption, the type found in
Gade, remains a threat.
It is possible to argue that there is implied conflict pre-emption
under §§ 33(a) and 45.120 The latter section provides that the
intent of the Act is to regulate commerce. 121 Commerce is earlier
defined in the Act as being "all commerce which may lawfully be
regulated by Congress." 22 The former section provides for condi-
tional exclusive nationwide use of a mark once it is registered.
12 s
These provisions are imbued pre-emptive force in at least two
situations. 2 4  In the first instance, the Act would pre-empt a
second comer's attempt to use state anti-dilution statutes against
the use of a federally registered mark. 21 In the second instance,
the anti-dilution law would be subject to pre-emption if it sought to
prevent the use of a registered trademark beyond the area of
natural expansion of the first comer plaintiff.126 In both cases,
the state anti-dilution statute would necessarily be pre-empted
because that is the only way to preserve the Lanham Act's grant of
an "exclusive right to use." 127 Federal rights will "always trump
an inconsistent state law."
128
If these situations did arise, it seems likely that a broadly worded
anti-dilution statute would fall under the Gade analysis. The
plurality would almost certainly find a direct conflict. Justice
Kennedy, on the other hand, could find these provisions, the
resultant conflict aside, to be indicative of non-talismanic express
pre-emption.
This approach does not, however, solve the more general problem
11 See De Sevo, supra note 112, at 302 (arguing there is no "serious issue" of field
preemption under Lanham Act).
'
2
0 Id. at 305.
121 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
122 Id.
123 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1994).
124 De Sevo, supra note 112, at 306.
125 Id.
'
2 Id. Contra Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 702 F. Supp.
1031, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1442 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 1026, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d 1961 (2d. Cir. 1989) (district court granted nation-wide injunction). The Mead
case is arguably not in conflict with the suggested pre-emption situation because the natural
expansion of sales for the Lexus car campaign was national.
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of whether the Congressional purpose behind the Act supports or
opposes state anti-dilution statutes. The pre-emption that would
occur in the above situations would merely counsel state legisla-
tures to be more careful in the drafting of their anti-dilution
legislation. If the legislatures did take a narrower approach,
finding conflict pre-emption would become more difficult.
Where neither the provisions of the statute nor its general
structure are indicative of a clear Congressional intent, by the
plurality's analysis and example, it is appropriate and necessary to
go into the legislative history of the federal act."2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LANHAM ACT
Opening up the legislative history of the Lanham Act is no
simple task. Enacted in 1946, the substance of the Act was the
subject of discussion and debate for years previous.130 Some of
this background legislative noise can be filtered out by concentrat-
ing on the history directly surrounding the passage of the Act. But
the problem even then is far from over. Forty two years after its
enactment the Act was substantially revised.'' One can hardly
expect, then, for a single Congressional intent to be easily discern-
ible.
1946 THE LANHAM ACT: MONOPOLIES AND UNIFORMITY
When the Lanham Act was passed there were no state dilution
laws.'3 2 But the theory of trademark dilution had been around
in academic circles for at least nineteen years.'3 3 The legislative
history, though, does not address directly the topic of anti-dilution
statutes. Commentators have urged, however, that the legislative
history gives adequate insight into how such state legislation would
'2 Gade, 505 U.S. at 102.
m'o COMMrrrEE ON PATENTS, S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1274, 1277 (1946)
(listing history of trademark measures from 1938 to 1946).
13' Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3985 (1988).
132Welkowitz, supra note 10, at 16.
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have been treated.14  To support their arguments, they point to
the economic fear that had delayed the very enactment of the
Lanham Act itself: the fear of monopolies. 1
5
The Senate Committee on Patents, in recommending for passage
the bill that would become the Lanham Act, assured the Senate
that it would not "foster[] hateful monopolies."3 6 While it is
likely that the fear of monopolies had grown from the economic
theory of the so-called "Harvard school," the final scope of the fear
is uncertain.'37 The fear may have been limited to the apprehen-
sion that a trademark would allow one producer to essentially
corner a product.'38 After the holder's mark became synonymous
with the product, he could then raise considerable barriers to
additional competition for that product. 31 On the other hand, the
fear may have been more ephemeral, rising even to the level of a
fear of monopolization of language itself.40 Regardless, before
the Act would reach an acceptable format, it was clear that there
would have to be some factor to counterbalance the monopoly fear.
From the outset, the purpose behind the Act had been the
protection of the public from deceit and swindling.14 ' Along with
that purpose it sought to foster fair competition.14 These goals
were consistent with the developmental roots of trademark law in
184 Handler, supra note 109, at 273 ("'The strong antimonopoly sentiment of that era
would have sensed in the dilution theory an attempt to fasten on the American people a new
species of monopoly."); Heald, supra note 108, at 1007.
' See Heald, supra note 108, at 1004 (discussing efforts of supporters of early version
of Lanham Act to convince others that trademark would not be governmental grant of
exclusive right).
13 S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 130, at 1274.
..
7 Jerre B. Swann & Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Dilution, an Idea Whose Time Has Gone;
Brand Equity as Protectible Property, the New/Old Paradigm, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 271
(1994) (authors cite "Harvard school" as being dominant economic paradigm into 1980's).138 Id. at 271; see Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical
History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 330 (1979) (analyzing economic theories
as they have changed and influenced development of trademark law).
"
9 See McClure, supra note 138, at 330.
1
,o See Handler, supra note 109, at 272 (common perception was monopoly of product was
preceded by monopoly of language).1 See S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 130, at 1274-75; Handler, supra note 109, at 273-274;
Heald, supra note 108, at 1002-1004.
142 S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 130, at 1274.
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fraud and deceit.143 These goals also suggested a means for
ameliorating the fear of monopolies. Trademark law was not about
creation of an ownership interest in the mark, so the solution lay
in making the real relationship between the trademark and the
trademark holder more apparent.
The counterbalance came in the requirement of a likelihood of
confusion. 144 The confusion requirement placed a limitation on
the trademark holder and his exclusive right to use the mark.
Before he could exercise the exclusivity of his mark, he would have
to demonstrate that through a likelihood of confusion, the public
was being harmed.145 The monopoly right, the right of exclusive
use, could therefore only be exercised when it was in the interest
of the public to prevent fraud and deceit. Such a limitation,
therefore, furthered the current and historic goals of trademark
regulation and counterbalanced fears about the self-interested
conduct of monopolies.
As has been previously discussed, however, the typical dilution
statute has no confusion requirement. 146  The harm that the
dilution statute seeks to prevent is not a harm to the public caused
by their confusion, but a harm to the trademark holder because the
distinctive quality of his mark is being lessened. Clearly, then,
dilution statutes would have been unacceptable to the Congress
that enacted the Lanham Act and would be antithetical to the
Congressional purposes behind the Act. 147
There is another Congressional purpose that some academics and
at least one district court have found persuasive. 48  It is the
argument that Congress intended, via the Lanham Act, to achieve
national uniformity in trademark laws. 149 As the Senate Commit-
14 Handler, supra note 109, at 273-274 (Any attempt to replace fraud and deceit with
trespass as underlying theory of trademark protection "is antithetical to the very origins and
course of development of the common and federal statutory law of trademarks and unfair
competition.").
1 Heald, supra note 108, at 1005.
1 J. McCarthy, 1 Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 5.04, at 140 (2d ed. 1984).
'"See notes 98-108 and accompanying text (discussing lack of confusion requirement and
resulting effect on scope of protection).
147 Handler, supra note 109, at 274.
'" Id. at 285 (citing H.R. REP. No. 944, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1939)); De Sevo, supra
note 112, at 307; United States Jaycees, 661 F. Supp. at 1368.
149 United States Jaycees, 661 F. Supp. at 1368.
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tee on Patents reported, one of the reasons for needing a new
federal trademark statute was that if the states could change the
law with respect to trademarks, there would be "as many different
varieties of common law as there are States."' The committee
emphasized that trade was no longer local; it was national.' 5 '
Consequently, it was unwise for trademark rights to vary from
state to state.152 Instead, the committee urged that national
legislation was needed to "secur[e] to the owners of trade-marks in
interstate commerce definite rights.""5
Another aspect of the legislative history that supports the
uniformity argument is found in § 45 of the Act. Over the nearly
eight years that the Act was debated, a constant source of discus-
sion was the inclusion of the following statement of the Act's intent:
.**to protect registered trademarks used in such (interstate)
commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation."'54
The disagreement was resolved in favor of inclusion. Explaining
the need for inclusion of the statement of intent is an interesting
comment from a House hearing:
[S]ince the concurrent jurisdiction of the State
governments over interstate commerce exists only to
the extent that such jurisdiction is not exclusively
appropriated and exercised by the Federal Govern-
ment, it is proper that the intention of Congress to
exclude the State governments from any interference
with the use of registered marks in such commerce
should be unequivocally stated in the act.'55
The consequent inclusion of the statement of intent, when read in
light of this legislative history, does seem to give weight to pre-
emption.
Proponents of the uniformity theory acknowledge that there are
'5o S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 130.
151 Id. at 1277.
152 Id.
163 Id.
15 Wetzel, supra note 110, at 246 (quoting Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
15 Wetzel, supra note 110, at 246 (citing testimony of Mr. Liddy: Hearings on H.R. 102,
H.R. 5461, and S. 895; 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 117, 129 (1941)).
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limited instances of coincident federal and state regulation.156
The Act itself indicates such overlap.'57 But, they insist that the
Congressional intention for national uniformity cannot be swal-
lowed by the Act's limited exceptions.'58
From the 1946 legislative history, it is fairly easy to pull out a
legislative history that would support finding a conflict between the
Congressional intention behind the Lanham Act and state dilution
statutes. However, the legislative history of the Act does not end
in 1946.1"9 In 1988, the Congress passed the Trademark Revision
Act.
1988 TRADEMARK REVISION ACT: PROTECTING THE MARK
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
From the perspective of anti-dilution/pre-emption, the most
interesting aspect of the 1988 Trademark Revision Act was what it
did not contain. Although the Senate had approved a federal anti-
dilution law, the House of Representatives struck that provi-
sion. 6 ' The text of the provision was the result of USTA and
Congressional efforts.' 6' It was presented to both houses, but it
was the Senate that took the initiative and sent the provision to
committee. 162 The provision emerged from committee with some
changes, but its structure remained intact." 3
The Senate report that accompanied the bill as it went to the
House stated that the federal antidilution provision had the narrow
'5 See, e.g., United States Jaycees v. Commodities Magazine, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1360,
1368 n.5 (N.D. Iowa 1987) ("[Tlhe legitimacy of state regulation in limited instances is clear
from the Act itself.").
1 See supra note 115.
158 See Handler, supra note 109, at 285-86 (arguing against dilution statutes because
although furthering protection of trademarks, they frustrate national uniformity).
"" The Lanham Act has been amended in part several times since its enactment. For the
purpose of the current discussion, however, it is more efficient to skip to the 1988 Trademark
Revision Act which directly dealt with the anti-dilution question.
" Laura M. Slenzak, Dilution Law in The United States and Canada: A Review of the
State of the Law and a Proposal for United States Federal Dilution Protection, 83 TRADEMARK
REP. 205, 222 (1993).
-
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purpose of protecting truly famous registered trademarks.16 The
report makes clear that likelihood of confusion, deception, or
mistake by the public is not the benchmark of the provision."
Instead, the statute protects the trademark's owner against actions
by a third party that "destroy the public's perception that the mark
signifies something unique, singular or particular."6 The report
goes on to clarify that instead of intending to protect the public, it
"focuses on the investment the owner has made in the mark." 67
The Senate report also acknowledges the inconsistency among
the states in the area of trademark dilution. 66 The federal
provision was intended to "establish a nationwide floor for protec-
tion against dilution."'69 Further, the federal provision was not
intended to pre-empt state regulation to the extent that such
provisions provide greater protection than does the federal
statute.
170
When the bill was introduced in the House, however, it was met
with Constitutional concerns.' 7 ' These concerns were not about
the pre-emptive intent of the Lanham Act, but rather related to the
First Amendment. 172  As a result, the dilution provision was
deleted from the bill that would go on to become the Trademark
Revision Act.
1 73
When the bill was returned to the Senate for approval of the
House changes, Sen. DeConcini, who had proposed the bill in the
Senate, expressed his disapproval of the deletion of the dilution
provision. 174  He reiterated that the Congress was missing an
excellent opportunity to provide "guidance" to the states for their
4 TRADEMARK LAW REVISION AcT OF 1988, S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)




07 Id. Even though the House deleted the provision, Rep. Kastenmeier, who introduced
the bill in the House, stated that it was important to protect the trademark owner's
"investment" in his trademark. Id.
1'8 Id.
169 S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
170 Id.
17 134 CONG. REC. H10419 (daily ed. October 19, 1988) (statement ofRep. Kastenmeier).1
" Id.
173 Id.
174 134 CONG. REC. S16972 (daily ed. October 20, 1988) (statement of Rep. DeConcini).
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own anti-dilution laws. 175 Sen. DeConcini also suggested that the
deletion of the provision should be read as nothing more than
Congressional inability to reach a consensus on satisfactory
language due to time constraints. 176 Further, he insisted that the
deletion should not be construed as a disagreement over the
"principles or objectives" of the provision. 177 These statements,
however, must be weighed against the statements of Rep. Kasten-
meier, who said that the provision was deleted because of "serious
first amendment issues [the provision] raised."171
The legislative history of the 1988 revision reflects a Congress
with a very different perspective. The legislative history from both
houses speaks approvingly of the protection of the trademark
holder's interest in the mark. 7 9 This was the great fear of the
1946 Congress. The shift from a limited right to an absolute right
in the work reflects the internalization of Schechter's thesis that
the mark itself is something to be protected for its own value. But,
significantly, the provision did not become part of federal law. If
one accepts Sen. DeConcini's account of the failure to include the
provision, it is only a matter of time constraints. 80 But looking
to Rep. Kastenmeier's description, the problem becomes consider-
ably more fundamental.''
The Congressional inability to pass the federal dilution statute
can be taken as evidence of a continuing dispute about the
propriety of dilution statutes under the Lanham Act.8 2 It seems
clear, however, that the House's concerns over the propriety of
dilution centered on First Amendment concerns, not on monopolis-
tic implications. The confusion element essential to the 1946
compromise was only necessary to assuage public concerns about
the monopolization of trademarks. Given the demise of that
concern, and the intent in the legislative history to protect the
175 Id.
176 Id. at 516973.
177 Id.
178 134 CONG. REC. H10419 (daily ed. October 19, 1988) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
'79 134 CONG. REC. S16972 (daily ed. October 20, 1988) (statement of Rep. DeConcini); 134
CONG. REC. H10419 (daily ed. October 19, 1988) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
'80 134 CONG. REC. 816973 (daily ed. October 20, 1988) (statement of Rep. DeConcini).
181 134 CONG. REc. H10419 (daily ed. October 19, 1988) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
1"2 Muller, supra note 108, at 180.
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trademark holder's investment, the necessity of the confusion
requirement is clearly diminished.
This would not be the case if the First Amendment concern is
classifiable as a fear of monopolization, essentially a fear that
freedom of expression could be infringed by a state's grant of an
anti-dilution action. As discussed, dilution theory rests on the
concept of conveying an ownership interest in the mark. Although
the legislative history of the Trademark Revision Act does not
elaborate on the contours of the First Amendment concern, if there
was this monopolistic element, there would be good ground for
keeping the confusion requirement.
As for concerns over uniformity, the legislative history of the
1988 revision reflects a desire not to supplant state regulation but
rather to guide it. 8 3 The Senate clearly perceived the federal
provision as a foundation on which the states would be free to build
greater protections.' 4 Also, because it failed to act dispositively,




The pre-emption in Gade was a tense marriage between an
expansive reading of implied pre-emption by the plurality, and an
expansive reading of express pre-emption by the concurrence. In
order for the two pre-emption readings to be of anything more than
academic interest, it is necessary either for them to be combined
again as they were in Gade or for the plurality's analysis to be
accepted by one additional justice.
Under the plurality's implied pre-emption analysis, it is unlikely
that a court would be able to satisfy itself with what is at best an
ambiguous declaration of intent from the statute itself. Instead the
court will plunge into the legislative history of the Act. What the
court finds will largely depend on what the court is looking for.
The question of which of the Congresses, the enactors of the
183 134 CONG. REC. S16972 (daily ed. October 20, 1988) (statement of Rep. DeConcini).
184 S. REP. NO. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.CAN. 5577,
5583.18 5 Paul C. Van Slyke, State Laws Against Trademark Dilution: Why They Should Not
Be Preempted by the Lanham Act, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 197, 203-04 (1993).
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Lanham Act or the revisioners, should be looked to is not answered
by the plurality's example in Gade. But a court would almost
certainly have to address the failed enactment of a federal dilution
provision. As discussed above, a court can adhere either to Senator
DeConcini's account (a consequence of time constraints) or to
Representative Kastenmeier's account (First Amendment/monopoly
concerns). Under the former account, the lack of a federal provision
does not tip the scales toward pre-emption. Under the latter
account, however, there is an argument that the trademark law is
incompatible with anti-dilution statute rights.
An interesting aspect of Gade, however, is the fact that the
legislative history relied on by the plurality was an unenacted
provision, like the federal anti-dilution statute. In Gade, the court
took the provision, which stated that more stringent state regula-
tion would be in conflict with the federal Act, as an indication of
the Congressional understanding that a state was required to have
its plan approved even if its standards were stricter. 1 6 Applying
a parallel logic, the federal dilution provision, which would not
have pre-empted state law, is indicative of a Congressional intent
that state dilution statutes should not be pre-empted. Whether a
court would feel bound by the plurality's actual treatment of the
legislative history in Gade is probably contingent upon the end the
court wishes to reach.
Depending on the philosophical disposition of the court, the
implied pre-emption analysis the plurality extols in Gade is either
a labyrinthine hell or a candy store. To courts that are truly trying
to divine a Congressional intent behind an Act with a legislative
life span of almost fifty years, the task is bewildering. To courts
that have a sweet tooth for legislative history, the implied pre-
emption is delightful, because the Lanham Act's history has
something for everyone. The result of the implied pre-emption
analysis will be wholly dependent on the aspect of the legislative
history the court chooses as its focus.
As to Justice Kennedy's express pre-emption analysis, it is
necessary that the provisions of the Lanham Act or its holistic
structure indicate a Congressional intent to preclude state regula-
'" Gade, 505 U.S. at 102.
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tion.187 Lacking such an indication, the state will be allowed to
ratchet up the protection. Is there such an indication of Congres-
sional intent to preclude ratcheting? Historically, Congress
anticipated and approved of state regulation of trademarks.
Kennedy's express pre-emption analysis, however, is confined to the
text of the Act."s
The Act lacks a provision that explicitly bars state regulation, but
as Kennedy stated in Gade, such explicitness is not required.8 9
While §§ 45 and 33(a) of the Act could be read to create an
exclusive field of federal regulation under certain circumstances,
such a reading has been opposed by commentators.' 9° It is thus
most likely that a Kennedy analysis would not pre-empt but
instead would allow the state statutes as an acceptable ratcheting
up.
CONCLUSION
Because none of the analytical frameworks espoused in Gade
captured a majority of the Court, none bind the lower courts.
When confronted with a pre-emption challenge under the Lanham
Act, application of the implied and express pre-emption frameworks
of the plurality and concurrence will not yield a dispositive answer.
Both analyses are broad in scope and open to judicial manipulation.
Inasmuch as Congress is clearly aware of the disparity between
federal and state regulation, it is probably the wisest course of
action to leave the matter to the Congress. The Lanham Act does
not explicitly pre-empt state regulation. Given the ambiguous
legislative history, it may well be that the only group who can, with
integrity, find the true intent of Congress is the Congress itself.
GEORGE G. BOYD, JR.
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